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CURRENT DECISIONS
quite possibly prove to satisfy this end while preserving the reliability
of strict contract law. The Illinois Court of Appeals in Pretzel v. Ander-
son20 achieved such by stating that the owner had both the right and
the power to terminate the agency without liability, but if the broker
proved a certain sum of money or energy expended in the attempt to
sell prior to the revocation he might recover on the basis of quantum
meruit. Thereby the principles of law were not sacrificed and a remedy
,was given in equity where one was necessary but none was provided
by law.
The decision in Hummer v. Engeman, as recited by the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia, does not preclude a quantum meruit re-
covery per se but makes no mention of its availablity to the broker.
The failure of the respondent to raise this issue may well explain the
omission of this point in the court's opinion, yet a statement in this
regard, even in the form of dicta, would have done much to clarify
and define the nature of listing agreements. "It is for the law to recog-
nize an obligation as arising from a promise as soon as justice requires." 2 1
By leaving the obvious question unanswered, Hummer v. Engeman
falls short.
Robert P. Wolf
Contracts-THE PAROL EvIDENCE RULE-EXCEPTIONS; THE PARTIAL
INTEGRATION AND COLLATERAL CONTRACTS DOCTRINES. Plaintiff, George
L. Durham, brought an action for damages for breach of an alleged
oral indemnification contract against the National Pool Equipment
Company of Virginia, defendant. This alleged contract concerned the
maximum cost of a swimming pool constructed for the plaintiff's motel
by the defendant. The defendant denied the allegation concerning the
oral contract. The defendant, in turn, contended that the entire agree-
ment between the parties was embodied in two written contracts. The
trial court struck the plaintiff's evidence concerning the oral contract
upon the defendant's motion. The lower court said the oral agreement
was "completely inconsistent" with the written contracts and inadmis-
sible because of the parol evidence rule. The plaintiff excepted to the
striking of this evidence. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia up-
held the plaintiff's contention that the parol evidence rule did not apply
20. 162 1M. App. 538 (1911).
21. Balantine, Acceptance of Offers For Unilateral Contracts by Partial Performance
of Service Requested, 5 MINN. L. REv. 94 (1921).
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to this case. The Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that the oral contract
was not inconsistent with the written contracts. This ruling was made
on the grounds that no provisions had been made for actual construc-
tion of the pool or its maximum cost.'
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia applied the partial integra-
tion doctrine in making its decision. The doctrine states in essence:
Where the entire agreement has not been reduced to writing, parol
evidence is admissible, not to contradict or vary its terms but to show
additional independent facts contemporaneously agreed upon in order
to establish the entire contract between the parties.2
This doctrine had its beginning in the case of Brent v. Richards. The
Brent case was recognized in few subsequent cases.4 The courts often
distinguished the case as one involving a reciprocal contract where only
one party reduced his obligation to writing." There was some belief
that the case was overruled by Slaughter v. Smither.6 The Durham
case relied heavily upon the doctrine initiated by the Brent case and
recognized that doctrine as an important exception to the parol evi-
dence rule.7
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia further reasoned that
the oral agreement was made collateral to the written contracts. The
oral agreement also related to a subject separate and distinct from those
of the written contracts." This reasoning relates closely to the collateral
contract doctrine initiated by the leading case of Sale v. Figg.9 The
collateral contract doctrine states:
1. Durham v. National Pool Equipment Co. of Va., 205 Va. 441, 138 S.E.2d 55 (1964).
2. High Knob, Inc. v. Allen, 205 Va. 503, 138 S.E.2d 49 (1964).
3. 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 539 (1846), in this case an oral option to repurchase a slave was
upheld along with a written bill of sale.
4. Tuley v. Barton, 79 Va. 387 (1884); Whitaker v. Lane, 128 Va. 317, 104 S.E. 252
(1920).
5. Towner v. Lucas, 54 Va. (13 Grat.) 705 (1857); Rector v. Hancock, 127 Va. 101,
102 S.E. 663 (1920).
6. 97 Va. 202, 33 S.E. 544 (1899); ef. Harriss, Magill & Co. v. John H. Rodgers &
Co., 129 S.E. 513 (1925), a dissent by J. Christian.
7. High Knob, Inc. v. Allen, supra note 2, 205 Va. at 506.
8. Trout v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 107 Va. 576, 59 S.E. 394 (1907); Adams v.
Seymour, 191 Va. 372, 61 S.E.2d 23 (1950).
9. 164 Va. 402, 180 SE. 173 (1935), in this case an oral contract made between vendor
and vendee of property prior to the signing of the deed was upheld. The oral con-




Under this doctrine the parol evidence rule does not exclude parol
proof of a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement that is- inde-
pendent of, collateral to, and not inconsistent with the written contract,
and which would not ordinarily be expected to be embodied in the
writing.10
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has been reluctant in apply-
ing the more liberal doctrines of the Brent and Sale cases. The Court
accepted a more conservative view of the parol evidence rule in the case
of Slaugbter v. Smither."l This conservative view had been strictly ad-
hered to in most cases.12 Such cases involved negotiable instruments,1 3
deeds, 14 written releases,15 oral warranties to repair,16 oral agreements
not to sue' 7 or compete,' 8 and exclusive licenses.' 9
o There seem to be two tests by which the court might determine the
applicability of the parol evidence rule. The first test is a subjective
one. The court must look into the intent of the parties at the time the
agreement was made.20 The court has full discretion in determining
the intent' and must judge intent by some external standard .22  This
10. High Knob, Inc. v. Allen, supra note 2, 205 Va. at 506.
11. Slaughter v. Smither, supra note 6, 97 Va. at 206, the Supreme Court disallowed
an oral contract not to compete and stated what has been regarded as the conservative
view: "... . to permit the parties to lay a foundation for adding to the contract by
oral testimony that they agreed that part only of the contract should be reduced to
writing would open the door to the very evil the rule was designed to avoid. The only
evidence of the completeness of a written contract, as a full expression of the terms
of the agreement, is the contract itself. Where parties have deliberately put their
mutual engagements into writing, in such language as imports a legal obligation, it is
only reasonable to presume that they have introduced into the written instrument every
material term and circumstance; and consequently all parol testimony of conversations
held between them, or declarations made by either of them, whether before, after,
or at the time of the completion of the contract, will be rejected.
12. Stewart-Warner torp. v. Smithey, 163 Va. 476, 175 S.E. 882 (1934); Cox v.
Parsons, 165 Va. 575, 183 S.E. 440 (1936); Pulaski National Bank v. Harrell, 203 Va.
227, 123 SE.2d 382 (1962); see, Moreland, The Parol Evidence Rule in Virginia, 3
WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 185 (1942), 7 VA. L. REv. 84 (1920).
13. Rector v. Hancock, supra note 5; Cox v. Parsons, supra note 12.
14. Trout v. Norfolk & Western Ry, supra note 8.
15. Harvey v. R. F. & P. Ry, 162 Va. 49, 173 SE. 351 (1934).
16. Farmer's Manufacturing Co. v. Woodworth, 109 Va. 596, 64 SE. 986 (1909).
17. Towner v. Lucas, supra note 5.
18. Slaughter v. Smither, supra note 6.
19. Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Smithey, supra note 12.
20. Cohn v. Dunn, 111 Conn. 342, 149 Ad. 851 (1930).
21. Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Machine Co., 141 U.S. 510, 12 S.Ct. 46 (1891);
Harrison v. McCormick, 89 Cal. 327, 26 P. 830 (1891).
22. Tuley v. Barton, supra note 4; Crawford v. Jarrett, 29 Va. (2 Leigh) 631 (1831);
Richardson v. Planters' Bank, 94 Va. 130, 26 S.E. 413 (1896).
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involves a close look at the conduct and language used by the parties and
the circumstances surrounding their negotiations.-3 The second test
which might be used by the courts is an objective one. The court re-
lates the actions of the actual parties involved to what normal parties
would have done in an identical situation.24 If the oral terms would
have normally been included in the writing the parol evidence rule ap-
plies. If the oral agreement was separate and distinct from the written
agreement and not dealt with in that agreement the parol evidence
rule would not apply.25 The court would then allow the jury to de-
termine if the oral terms were made as a matter of fact.26
The latter test has been accepted more favorably by Virginia courts
in conjunction with the following rule on admissibility of parol evi-
dence: 0
Where it is not apparent from the writing itself that something is
omitted to be supplied, where the writing is perfect in itself and is
capable of a clear and intelligible exposition from the terms of which
it is composed, a complete integration will be presumed.27
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals did not use this objective
test in the Durham case. The Court interpreted the case in light of the
intent of the parties. An application of the conservative test might
have rendered a different decision. High Knob, Inc. v. Allen25 was
decided on the same day as the Durham case. Both the partial integration
and collateral contract doctrines were invoked in the High Knob case.
23. Cohn v. Dunn, supra note 20; Brosty v. Thompson, 79 Conn. 133, 64 Ad. 1
(1906); see, 9 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2430 (3d ed. 1940).
24. Gianni v. Russell, 281 Pa. 320, 126 Ad. 791 (1924); Wagner v. Marcus, 288 Pa.
579, 136 Ad. 847 (1927); Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 160 N.E. 646 (1928); see, 4
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 638 (3d ed. 1957); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACts § 240(b) (1932).
25. Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Machine Co, supra note 21; Trout v. Norfolk
& Western Ry., supra note 8.
26. Cornett v. Rhudy, 80 Va. 710 (1885); Tyler v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 88 Va.
389, 13 S.E. 975 (1891).
27. Wheeler v. Wardell, 173 Va. 168, 3 S.E.2d 377 (1939); Jones v. Franklin, 160
Va. 266, 168 S.E. 753 (1933); Coal Rivers Collieries v. Eureka Coal and Wood Co., 144
Va. 263, 132 S.E. 337 (1926); Hopkins v. Le Cato, 142 Va. 769, 128 S.E. 55 (1925); Fen-
tress v. Steele & Sons, 110 Va. 578, 66 S.E. 870 (1910); Hughes v. Tinsley, 80 Va. 259;
see, MARSHALL, FITZHUGH & HELvIN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VA. AND WEST VA.
5 246 (1st ed. Michie 1954); MORELAND, supra note 12, at 202.
28. High Knob, Inc. v. Allen, supra note 2, in this case the Supreme Court allowed
parol evidence to be admitted to show that an oral collateral agreement concerning
water supply was made outside of the deed.
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The Supreme Court used a subjective test in that case and the parol
evidence rule was not applied.
In light of the Durham and High Knob cases a more progressive
outlook may be taken by the Virginia courts toward the parol evidence
rule. This will be accomplished by a greater utilization of the partial
integration and collateral contracts doctrines as exceptions to the parol
evidence rule.
Jerry Franklin
Contracts-IFANT BOUND AS THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY. Plaintiff's
father entered into a contract for medical service with the defendant
Ross-Loos Medical Group, the agreement providing coverage for the
plaintiff, Robin Doyle, an unemancipated minor, and including a pro-
vision for settling disputes by arbitration. A malpractice claim was
brought under the policy on behalf of the infant daughter; Ross-Loos
referred the matter to arbitration as set forth in the contract. The board
of arbitrators found against the infant on the evidence and the lower
court entered judgment for the defendant, denying the plaintiff's con-
tention that Robin Doyle, as a minor, could avoid the contract and award
and bring a common law action. In Doyle v. Giuliuccil the California
Supreme Court affirmed the findings, holding that the best interests of
the child would be served by maintaining the integrity of the contract.
Several previous decisions seem to lay down the rule that should have
been decisive here, i.e., the concept that an infant may avoid an arbitra-
tion clause in a contract to which he is a party.2 However the California
court held that while an infant may perhaps not bind himself to arbi-
tration in a contract, his parents, in fulfilling a legal duty to provide
medical care to the child, can bind the minor as a third party beneficiary.
Yet, similiarly, it has also been well established,3 even in ancient law,4
that a guardian may not commit his ward's interests to arbitration for
the same reasons that the minor himself may not. The only uncertainty
1. Doyle v. Giullucci, 43 Cal. Rptr. 297, 401 P.2d 1 (1965).
2. Millsaps v. Ftes, 137 N.C. 535, 50 SE. 227 (1906); Jones v. Payne, 41 Ga. 23
(1870); Jones v. Phoenix Bank, 8 N.Y. 228 (1853).
3. Hume v. Hume, 3 Pa. St. 144 (1846); Fowler v. Lewis, 36 W.Va. 112, 14 SE. 447
(1892).
4. FL. 1.4, t. 8, s. 11, art. 1. (V). (Code of Justinian).
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